There is a pattern that repeats across history. A power structure rises, peaks, plateaus, and then begins its long, predictable decline. The conservative mind, as Corey Robin observed, is not merely resistant to change—it is structurally incapable of recognising this curve until it is too late. The conservative defends the present, which is already waning. The progressive defends a utopia, which does not yet exist. But the trendsetter—the one who holds power as a tool rather than an identity—pivots early to the next wave.
We are living through this pattern in real time. The fossil fuel paradigm is in decline. The renewable and electrification wave is rising. And the MAGA reaction, like the conservative mind before it, is fighting to preserve a position that is already obsolete.
I. The Fossil Fuel Paradigm: The Waning Present
The numbers are unambiguous. In 2025, global solar PV generation increased by 600 TWh—the largest annual rise ever recorded for any power source outside of a post-crisis rebound. Renewable energy is now outpacing coal, with nuclear generation simultaneously reaching historic highs. Clean energy investment has grown to USD 2.2 trillion in 2026, almost double that of fossil fuels. The IEA projects that renewables, nuclear, and other low-emissions sources will reach 50% of global electricity generation by 2030.
Fossil fuels are not disappearing overnight. Total spending on fossil fuel supply in 2026 is expected to reach just over USD 1 trillion, returning to 2024 levels. But the direction of travel is clear. The share of fossil fuels is projected to decline from 80% today to 50% in 2035 and 20% or less in 2050. Electrification is becoming the primary structural driver of fossil fuel decline across all major end-use sectors.
This is the reverse S-curve. The plateau is ending. The waning has begun.
II. The MAGA Reaction: The Conservative Trap in Action
The MAGA movement’s response to this transition is a textbook case of the reactionary mind. Rather than pivoting, it clings. Rather than adapting, it fights to preserve the existing hierarchy.
In 2026, a majority of Republicans say the United States should prioritise fossil fuels like oil, coal and natural gas—a reversal of Republican views in 2020. The Trump administration has vowed to boost production of fossil fuels and repeal key parts of the 2022 climate law. The Department of Energy is ordering the construction of the nation’s first coal-fired power plant since 2013, giving millions to a far-right activist to build it.
Republican lawmakers are introducing sweeping legislation to shield Big Oil companies from attempts to hold them accountable for their role in the climate crisis. The “Stop Climate Shakedowns Act” would grant sweeping legal immunity to the fossil fuel industry. The American Petroleum Institute has made stopping “extreme climate liability policy” a top priority in 2026.
At the state level, Utah passed a law to insulate oil companies against efforts to make them pay for their role in global warming. Republicans are working to shield fossil fuel companies from laws and legal claims that aim to make them pay for climate damage.
This is not policy. It is a rearguard action. The MAGA movement has conflated its identity with the fossil fuel power structure. To admit that renewables are the future would be to admit that its own identity is obsolete. So it fights to preserve a declining order—not because it is rational, but because it is invested.
III. The Academic-Liberal Counter-Wave: The Utopian Project
On the other side, the academic-liberal establishment defends a different vision: the energy transition as a moral and technological imperative. This is the progressive’s utopia—the future that does not yet exist, but must be built.
The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal, launched in early 2025, aims to address the twin challenges of competitiveness and decarbonisation. The Commission has identified the need for annually installing 100 GW of renewable electricity capacity up to 2030. The EU’s renewable energy target of 42.5% by 2030 is a clear signal of ambition.
Public opinion research shows that support for renewable energy investment increases when policies include social transfers and progressive financing mechanisms. The synergy between ecological and social goals is increasingly recognised.
But the progressive project is not immune to the identity trap. The academic-liberal defender can become attached to their vision of the future, conflating the idea of the transition with their own identity as its champion. The utopia becomes a badge of identity, not merely a policy goal.
IV. The External Pivot: China and the New Wave
The trendsetter does not wait. They pivot early to the next wave, and they pivot externally—recognising that the new order is already emerging elsewhere.
China is the most dramatic example. In 2025, Chinese brands controlled about two-thirds of all electric vehicle sales worldwide. China produced nearly three-quarters of the 22 million electric cars manufactured in 2025 and accounted for more than 80% of global battery cell production. By April 2026, electric vehicles made up 61% of new car sales in China.
The IEA estimates it is at least 30% cheaper to produce a small electric SUV in China than in more advanced economies, largely because of lower battery costs and elaborate supply chains. China’s new energy vehicle sector has become a dominant force, with its share set to surpass 50% of total sales in 2026, up from 5.34% in 2020.
Meanwhile, the EU is expanding clean energy capacity but is outpaced by China. China now has 2.4 times the EU’s clean energy capacity and is deploying clean power at five times the EU’s rate. The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal is a response to this reality—but it is a reactive response, not a proactive pivot.
The trendsetter would have moved earlier. The follower is still catching up.
V. The Cynic vs. The Trendsetter: The Facade of Power
The MAGA defender of fossil fuels is not necessarily a cynic. They often believe in the cause. They have conflated their identity with the fossil fuel power structure. But the cynic is different: the one who knows the structure is declining but clings to it because they have no alternative. They cannot pivot because they have no transferable proficiency. They are role-holders, not craftspeople.
The trendsetter, by contrast, has substance. They can re-tool, re-educate, upskill, and cyclically invest. They are not attached to a specific role; they are attached to competence itself. The professional stripped of status, stripped of network, shunned by their nation, moved abroad—would still have skills. They could rebuild. The cynic cannot.
The facade is the difference. The cynic uses the language of power but has nothing behind it. The trendsetter uses the language as a tool, but they are not trapped by it. They remain aware that the language is a tool, not a self.
VI. The Language Trap: Words as Constitutive, Not Just Descriptive
Language is not merely a vehicle for power; it is part of the structure of power itself. Words give concepts and ideas meaning and definition. The fossil fuel industry’s language of “energy independence” and “American energy” is not just description—it is constitution. It creates the reality it claims to describe.
The trendsetter who uses conservative language as a tool is not immune to its effects. The language shapes their thinking, even if they believe they are merely using it. Over time, the use of the language becomes the identity. The trendsetter becomes the follower. This is the identity-conflation in action.
The trendsetter who can sustain detachment, who can hold power without being held by it, is rare. Most become followers of their own success.
VII. The EU’s Hidden Strength: Global Connectivity
The fossil fuel paradigm is dying. The MAGA reaction is clinging to a waning structure. But the EU has something neither of them possesses: a global nervous system. While the United States retreats into its own contradictions, and while China builds its own parallel order, the EU remains the most interconnected actor on the planet.
- Trade: The EU is the world’s second-largest exporter and importer of goods. In 2025, the EU’s trade in goods balance registered a surplus of €130 billion.
- Digital: EU digital trade in services reached €3 trillion in 2024. The International Digital Strategy, launched in June 2025, aims to expand international partnerships and strengthen security and global digital governance.
- Diplomacy: The EU maintains the largest diplomatic network in the world, with 145 EU Delegations across every continent. This network is not ceremonial; it is operational.
- Infrastructure: The Global Gateway is the EU’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, identifying five pillars—digital, energy, transport, health, and education.
- Humanitarian: The EU is a leading global humanitarian aid donor, providing €1.9 billion in initial humanitarian aid in 2025.
- Regulatory: The EU’s regulatory power—the GDPR, the AI Act, the Digital Markets Act—is perhaps its most underappreciated asset. These are not just European laws. They are global benchmarks.
The Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index (GEOII) confirms the EU remains the most interconnected actor in its neighbourhood. But its role has become contested. China has been catching up in key areas. Russia continues to exert leverage through energy supplies and coercive tactics.
VIII. The Trendsetter’s Playbook: How the EU Leverages Its Connectivity
The EU has the network. It has the institutions. It has the regulatory power. What it lacks is the mentality—the capacity to see its connectivity as a tool to be deployed, not an identity to be defended.
1. Make the Global Gateway Distinctive
The EU should focus its Global Gateway on two sectors: digital infrastructure and energy transition. These are the areas where the EU has genuine competitive advantage—where it can offer something that China cannot. China offers infrastructure without governance. The EU can offer infrastructure with governance—with transparency, accountability, and rule of law.
2. Leverage the Regulatory Power
The EU’s regulatory power is its most underutilised asset. The EU should proactively export its regulatory model, not defensively protect it. This means making regulatory alignment a condition of partnership, not a concession.
3. Deepen the Diplomatic Network
The EU should be investing in its diplomatic network, not cutting it. It should be expanding its presence in the Global South, where the competition for influence is most intense.
4. Use Connectivity as a Hedge
The EU’s connectivity is not just a tool for projecting influence. It is also a hedge against the decline of the current order. The EU is not dependent on any single partner, any single market, any single energy source. This diversification is its insurance policy.
5. Recognise the S-Curve and Act Before It’s Too Late
The EU must set a hard deadline for the fossil fuel phase-out: 2030, not 2040. It must accelerate defence integration and reduce its dependence on US defence supplies. It must reform its decision-making process so that it can act with speed and agility.
IX. The Trap to Avoid: Becoming Attached to Connectivity
The EU’s greatest risk is not failure—it is successful failure. It is the risk of becoming attached to its own connectivity. The trendsetter who pivots early to the next wave can become the follower of their own success. They build a new hierarchy, and then they defend it—conflating the new structure with their identity, falling into the same trap they once escaped.
The EU must avoid this. It must remain aware that its connectivity is not an identity. It is a tool. The EU must build institutions that are designed to be renewed—that can be reconfigured, reformed, or replaced as the wave shifts. The structure endures, but its configuration must be continuously adapted.
This is the hardest lesson: the pivot is not a destination. It is a method. The EU must become a pivoting machine—an institution that is structurally capable of recognising the S-curve and moving before the decline becomes irreversible. Not once, but continuously.
Coalitions Under the Auspices of EU Institutions
The mechanism for renewal already exists within the EU’s legal architecture. The EU is not a fortress to be defended; it is a platform to be used. It is a set of mechanisms that can be activated by coalitions of the willing. The trendsetter does not try to rebuild the entire structure; they build within it, using its own mechanisms to create the next wave.
The EU already has the legal architecture for this:
- Enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU) allows a subgroup of member states to move faster in a specific area, without waiting for unanimity.
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence is a coalition of the willing within the EU framework.
- The Eurozone is itself a coalition—not all member states are in it, but it operates under the EU’s institutional umbrella.
- The Schengen Area is another coalition—a subset of member states that have deepened integration on border policy.
These are not exceptions to the EU. They are features of the EU. The EU is not a single, uniform structure; it is a platform for coalitions.
The trendsetter’s playbook for the EU:
- Identify a new wave. The next wave is not fossil fuels. It is not even renewables alone. It is the integration of digital, energy, and defence—a triad of strategic autonomy that no single member state can achieve alone.
- Build a coalition of the willing. Not all member states will move at the same speed. The coalition starts with a core—France, Germany, the Benelux, the Nordics, or any combination that has the capacity and the will.
- Operate under the EU framework. The coalition uses the EU’s institutional machinery—its budget, its regulatory power, its diplomatic network—but it does not wait for consensus. It moves at the speed of the willing.
- Demonstrate success. The coalition’s achievements become the new baseline. Other member states, seeing the benefits, join later. The coalition expands. The structure evolves.
- Renew the institutions. The coalition’s success forces the EU institutions to adapt—to become more agile, more responsive, more capable of supporting the next wave. The institutions are not replaced; they are renewed by the coalitions that operate within them.
The EU’s institutions endure, but their configuration is continuously adapted. This is how the EU can become a pivoting machine—not by dissolving, but by renewing itself through the coalitions that operate within it.
X. The Verdict: The Trap is Always Open
The fossil fuel paradigm is waning. The renewable and electrification wave is rising. The MAGA movement is fighting to preserve a declining order because it has conflated its identity with that order. The academic-liberal establishment is building a utopia, but it too risks becoming trapped by its own identity-investment.
The trendsetter—the one who can pivot early, re-tool, re-educate, and cyclically invest—is the one who escapes the trap. They hold power as a tool, not as an identity.