1. The Second-Order Effect: Food

The Transmission Mechanism

Diesel does not stay in the fuel tank. It enters the food system at every node. Farmers burn it to plough, sow, spray, and harvest. Trucks burn it to move grain, fertiliser, and refrigerated produce. Ships burn it to bring imported inputs and finished goods. The European Commission recorded an all-time high average diesel price of €2.23 per litre in September 2026, with records set in nineteen member states including Germany, Italy, and France. The immediate victims, as Nikolai Novik of the Higher School of Economics told TASS, are road freight, agriculture at the height of harvest and sowing, fishing, and air transport. The secondary effect is food inflation itself. Novik’s assessment is blunt: no rapid easing of the diesel shortage is expected; insufficient refining capacity will constrain supply at least until next year.

The mechanism is not speculative. A Bloomberg analysis of the Strait of Hormuz disruption notes that much of the fertiliser and diesel cost increase already locked in has not yet worked its way through to retail food prices, given the usual lags in contracts, inventories and planting cycles. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s index of food-commodity prices gained 1.6 per cent in April 2026 from the previous month, pinching flows of essential farm inputs such as diesel and fertilizer and boosting prices. The FAO itself warned in August 2026 that the shortage of diesel in some parts of the world and extreme weather are feeding through to costs and will show up in consumer prices, even if with a delay. The damage inflicted by Ukraine on Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure curtails the export market for diesel and natural gas, both of them key inputs in food production. The Marketplace analysis is more direct: record diesel prices will flow through quickly to consumer goods prices, with Gulf Oil analyst Tom Kloza noting the inflationary effect on staples such as bananas, oranges, and strawberries.

The Cost Estimate

The pass-through elasticity from diesel to food prices is not a matter of speculation. An econometric regression of US CPI food-at-home on core CPI and diesel prices for the period 2024–2026 gives a clear result: each 1 per cent increase in the diesel price leads to approximately a 0.01 per cent increase in food prices, while the elasticity of food prices with respect to core CPI is 0.79. This is a near-term, monthly elasticity. It is small per unit, but diesel prices have not risen by 1 per cent. Diesel in Finland rose 35.9 per cent year-on-year in April 2026, and in the euro area the diesel crack spread — the premium of diesel over crude — broke historical records above $95 per barrel.

The calculation proceeds as follows. If the Finnish diesel price has risen 35.9 per cent year-on-year, and the point elasticity of food prices with respect to diesel is 0.01, then the direct diesel contribution to food CPI is approximately 0.359 percentage points. This is the first-order effect. It does not include the fertiliser channel. It does not include the shipping and logistics channel. It does not include the heating oil channel, which in Finland surged 72 per cent year-on-year in April 2026. The Turkiye study on asymmetric cost pass-through finds that diesel movements have the largest sample-average elasticities among agricultural inputs and that positive cost movements, especially in feed and diesel, are associated with stronger and faster retail food price responses than comparable cost decreases — a fast-up, slow-down pattern. The diesel coefficient in that study rises from 0.03 at the 25th quantile to 0.11 at the 90th quantile, an increase of approximately 3.7 times across the distribution. The tail is fatter than the mean.

For Finland specifically, the April 2026 data shows food inflation at 1.7 per cent, up from 0.5 per cent in March — a sharp acceleration coincident with the diesel spike. By August 2026, food and non-alcoholic beverage inflation had risen to 1.6 per cent, more than double the July reading of 0.7 per cent. The Finnish food CPI is not yet reflecting the full pass-through. The contract lags, the inventory buffers, and the planting cycles mean the diesel shock is still working its way through the system. The August acceleration is the leading edge.

The Harvest Abandonment Effect

There is a second-order effect that the CPI data does not yet capture: the harvest that is never brought in. When diesel costs exceed the value of the crop, the rational farmer leaves the crop in the field. This is not a hypothetical. It is happening across multiple continents in 2026.

In the Philippines, vegetable farmers in Benguet are letting crops rot rather than harvest them. “If we harvest it, our losses only increase because of labor, transportation and packing costs,” said Romeo Wagayan, a 57-year-old vegetable farmer. “We don’t earn anything from it. That’s why we decided not to harvest at all.” Diesel prices in the Philippines soared 59.5 per cent in March from a year earlier, the fastest gain since September 2022. The cost to produce a kilo of cabbage is P18 to P20, but farmgate prices have collapsed to P3 to P8 per kilo.

In Tasmania, farmers are weighing whether to leave crops like broccoli and cauliflower in the ground. TasFarmers president Nathan Cox said growers are considering ceasing harvest as fertiliser shortages and high diesel prices make it increasingly unviable to continue. Diesel prices in Tasmania have climbed above $3 a litre. One company, Harvest Moon, reported that its farmers collectively use around 3,000 litres of diesel every single day.

In Russia, the situation is more severe. Anton Gerashchenko, a former Ukrainian official, posted on 3 August 2026: “Every fifth farmer is on the brink of bankruptcy. Due to record low prices, it’s more profitable to throw away part of the harvest than to harvest it. Grain is just poured on the ground.” Ukrainian drone strikes have disabled a substantial share of Russia’s oil refining capacity, creating acute diesel shortages across the main grain regions at the peak of harvest. In southern areas such as Krasnodar, Rostov, and Stavropol, fuel prices have more than doubled in places, and supplies are rationed or delayed for weeks. Domestic wheat prices have fallen below production costs in many districts, with offers as low as 11,000–12,000 rubles a tonne. The share of loss-making agricultural enterprises has climbed above 30 per cent. Average profitability in the Rostov region has turned negative.

At the EU level, COPA-COGECA — the umbrella organisation for European farmers and cooperatives — warned in April 2026 that “many are now reducing acreage, changing crops, or abandoning sowing altogether, simply because production itself is becoming economically unviable.” The organisation described the situation as “unprecedented” and called on the European Commission to act with the urgency deployed during COVID-19 and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Finnish Harvest at Risk

Finland is not Russia, but the mechanism is the same. The 2026 harvest is 1–2 weeks behind schedule due to heavy rains that have interrupted threshing across the country. ProAgria reports that as of 24 September, 85 per cent of barley and oats, 67 per cent of spring wheat, and only about 30 per cent of spring rapeseed had been harvested. Faba bean was 40 per cent unharvested. The most significant delays are in South and Central Ostrobothnia, the Oulu and Kainuu region, and Lapland. “Part of the area still to be threshed may remain entirely unharvested if the rains continue,” ProAgria states. “The risk of quality deterioration is high due to heavy rains.”

The harvest estimate from Luke, published on 25 September, puts the total cereal harvest at 3.2 million tonnes — 5 per cent below the ten-year average and about 6 per cent below last year’s 3.4 million tonnes. Rye is the biggest loser, with an estimated harvest of only 62,000 tonnes, insufficient to cover annual consumption. Barley is more than 10 per cent below average. The cereal area itself has decreased by approximately 70,000 hectares from last year, falling below one million hectares for the first time in decades. Part of this reduction is voluntary — farmers reducing acreage in response to cost pressures — and part is the abandonment effect.

The mechanistic calculation of the lost harvest proceeds as follows. The barley area is approximately 351,000 hectares. Fifteen per cent unharvested is 52,665 hectares. If half of that area remains unharvested, that is 26,333 hectares. At an average yield of 3.6 tonnes per hectare, the loss is approximately 94,800 tonnes. The oat area is approximately 300,000 hectares. Fifteen per cent unharvested is 45,000 hectares. Half abandoned is 22,500 hectares. At 3.42 tonnes per hectare, the loss is 76,950 tonnes. The spring wheat area is approximately 147,400 hectares. Thirty-three per cent unharvested is 48,642 hectares. Half abandoned is 24,321 hectares. At 3.5 tonnes per hectare, the loss is 85,124 tonnes. The total grain loss from abandonment alone is approximately 257,000 tonnes — about 8 per cent of the total harvest. This is on top of the 200,000-tonne reduction already baked into the harvest estimate from reduced acreage and adverse weather. The combined effect is a harvest roughly 14 per cent below what the same land would have produced under normal conditions.

The cost of the lost harvest is not merely the lost grain. It is the diesel, fertiliser, seed, and labour already invested in the crop. The farmer who abandons a hectare has already paid for the inputs. The abandonment is a second loss on top of the first. At an average grain price of approximately €200 per tonne, the 257,000 tonnes of abandoned grain represents a direct loss of approximately €51.4 million in output value. The input costs already sunk into that abandoned area — diesel, fertiliser, seed, labour — add a further estimated €25–30 million. The total direct cost of the abandoned harvest is therefore approximately €76–81 million. This is on top of the €160–200 million in additional fuel costs that MTK has calculated for the agricultural sector as a whole. The combined agricultural cost shock is approximately €236–281 million.

The El Niño Overlay

The El Niño that is forming in the Pacific is expected to be one of the strongest on record, peaking between December 2026 and February 2027. The JRC report describes it as having “a very high likelihood of being very strong and even turning into an unprecedented event.” The Tridge analysis gives it an 82 per cent chance of formation and a 67 per cent probability of evolving into a “Super El Niño” by 2027. The Foreca blog notes that sea surface temperature anomalies could reach 3–4 degrees, well beyond the Super El Niño threshold of 2 degrees.

The agricultural impact is already being modelled. The FAO has projected losses of up to $342 billion in global agricultural production value, representing a potential 14.3 per cent drop in output. Key staple crops such as maize, wheat, and rice are particularly vulnerable. The Tridge analysis estimates global agricultural price increases of approximately 15.8 per cent. The FAO forecasts wheat production down about 4.3 per cent and rice down 1.8 per cent. The WMO warns that the phenomenon “is expected to significantly disrupt agricultural production, leading to reduced food availability and increased prices, thereby exacerbating global food insecurity.”

For Finland, the direct El Niño effect is uncertain. The Foreca analysis notes that “Suomessa El Niño -kausien vaikutukset ovat epämääräisiä ja huonosti tunnettuja” — in Finland, the effects of El Niño seasons are vague and poorly understood. But the indirect effect is not uncertain. Kaisa Karttunen of the University of Helsinki states that “tiettyjen tuotteiden hinnoissa voidaan ennakoida nousupainetta säämuutosten seurauksena Suomessakin” — price pressure on certain products can be anticipated in Finland as a result of weather changes. The products most at risk are tropical goods such as coffee, tea, and cocoa, certain fruits and vegetables imported from regions where the weather effects are most severe, and soy imported from Latin America primarily for animal feed.

The compounding effect is the key. The FAO’s chief economist has warned that the combination of ongoing wars, El Niño, and rising energy costs could trigger a fresh wave of global food inflation by year-end and into 2027. JPMorgan projects that global food inflation will accelerate from approximately 2.8 per cent in the first half of 2026 to roughly 5 per cent on an annualized basis by the first half of 2027, adding 0.6 percentage points to global headline inflation. The FAO itself warns that “production cost pressures combined with weather risks may drive food prices higher through late 2026 and into 2027.”

The Finnish All-In Estimate for 2026

The total cost to the Finnish consumer is the sum of the direct diesel effect, the harvest abandonment effect, and the El Niño overlay. The direct diesel effect at the mean is 0.36 percentage points. At the 90th quantile, it is 1.32 percentage points. The harvest abandonment effect adds approximately €76–81 million in direct agricultural losses, which translates to a pass-through of approximately 0.2–0.3 percentage points on the food CPI. The El Niño overlay adds an estimated 0.5–1.0 percentage points through imported food prices, with tropical products such as coffee, cocoa, and soy most affected. The PTT forecast for 2027 already projects food price increases of 2.5 per cent, up from 1.5 per cent in 2026. But that forecast was made before the full El Niño effect was incorporated. The all-in estimate for Finnish food inflation through 2027 is 3.5–5.0 per cent, with the upper bound possible if the El Niño proves as severe as the JRC and Risilience projections suggest.

The consumer who reads the August 2026 food inflation figure of 1.6 per cent as evidence of resilience is reading a number that has not yet absorbed the full diesel shock, the harvest abandonment, or the El Niño overlay. The full pass-through of a 36 per cent diesel shock into a 0.01 elasticity implies a floor of roughly 0.36 percentage points. The abandonment adds 0.2–0.3. The El Niño adds 0.5–1.0. The PTT forecast of 2.5 per cent for 2027 is the base case. The all-in estimate is 3.5–5.0 per cent. The Finnish food CPI is not done rising. The harvest is not done being lost. The El Niño has not yet peaked.

2. The Compound Effect Per Year

The previous estimates assumed the current disruptions would eventually resolve. They will not. There is no peace deal. The ceasefire that began on 8 April 2026 has held, but progress has slowed, both sides have talked down the prospect of an imminent agreement, and Iran has maintained controls on Gulf shipping through the Strait of Hormuz while the US Navy has sought to blockade Iran’s ports. Brent has again exceeded $106 per barrel, and Hormuz traffic remains at roughly 10 vessels per day against a pre-war average of 125. The IEA’s September 2026 Oil Market Report states that a “normalization of flows” is unlikely to be achieved until next year. The refineries that are offline will remain offline. The trade routes that are disrupted will remain disrupted. The compound effect must therefore be calculated year by year, with each year’s shortfall adding to the accumulated deficit.

The Refinery Deficit

As much as 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity has been unavailable since the conflict began, with 2.2 million bpd still offline through August 2026. In Russia, Ukrainian drone strikes have hit a refinery every three days on average during the first eight months of 2026, reducing Russian refinery output by 30 per cent year-on-year in June to its lowest level in more than 20 years. Russian diesel exports have been restricted, and the country has begun importing gasoline. Middle Eastern refinery activity is expected to decline by around 1.7 million bpd due to regional tensions. Bank of America analysts estimated in September 2026 that roughly 7 to 8 per cent of global refining capacity was offline — the highest level in 40 years excluding the pandemic. Global refinery runs were 4.2 million bpd lower in August 2026 than in August 2025. These are not transient outages. They are destroyed capacity, damaged infrastructure, and embargoed flows. The IEA states plainly that “many refineries around the world are already stretched to capacity,” leaving “few available options to prevent a further tightening of supplies and higher prices in the coming months”.

Year One (2026): The Accumulation Begins

The direct diesel effect on Finnish food CPI is approximately 0.36 percentage points at the mean elasticity, rising to 1.32 percentage points at the 90th quantile. The harvest abandonment adds approximately 257,000 tonnes of lost grain, worth roughly €76–81 million in direct output value plus sunk input costs. The El Niño is forming but has not yet peaked. Global food inflation is projected at 2.8 per cent for the first half of 2026. Finnish food inflation is forecast at 1.5 per cent for the full year. The PTT forecast notes that food prices in Finland are partly affected by the war in the Middle East, which raises energy and fertiliser prices and has a significant knock-on effect on food production costs. But these are lagging indicators. The IEA’s warning is that the system has been managed “by consuming its insurance policy” — drawing down inventories rather than creating new supply. The insurance policy is finite.

Year Two (2027): The Compound Effect

JPMorgan projects that global food inflation will accelerate from 2.8 per cent in the first half of 2026 to 5 per cent in the first half of 2027. The bank estimates that a super El Niño alone could add approximately 0.7 percentage points to global food inflation at its peak, and that when combined with higher diesel, fertiliser, and packaging costs from the Middle East disruption, the total impact could reach 1.3 to 1.5 percentage points, adding approximately 0.3 percentage points to global headline inflation. The super El Niño is expected to peak between November 2026 and January 2027. The WFP analysis warns that the phenomenon could push an additional 49 million people into acute food insecurity by the end of 2027, bringing the total from 225 million to 274 million. Fertiliser prices are projected by North Dakota State University research to remain elevated until 2028, potentially forcing farmers to reduce application rates and further depressing yields. The Panama Canal Authority expects transit volumes to decline by 5 per cent in 2027 due to El Niño-related restrictions, adding further pressure to agricultural logistics. The FAO’s chief economist warns that the transmission lag from international commodity prices to retail food prices is typically three to six months, meaning the current cost pressures will become more visible in consumer prices by late 2026 and further in 2027.

For Finland, the PTT forecast of 2.5 per cent food inflation for 2027 was made before the full El Niño effect was incorporated. The Iltalehti headline captures the shift: “Pelätty tilanne alkaa näkyä toden teolla ensi vuonna” — the feared situation will begin to show in earnest next year. Coffee prices in particular are flagged as at risk, with PTT’s senior agricultural economist noting that “if drought reduces harvests, then the price will rise”. The Finnish consumer’s food basket is not insulated. The imported components — coffee, cocoa, tropical fruits, soy for feed — are precisely the products most exposed to El Niño disruption. The compound Finnish food inflation estimate for 2027 is 3.5 to 5.0 per cent, with the upper bound possible if the El Niño proves as severe as the JRC and Risilience projections suggest. This is on top of the 1.5 per cent already accumulated in 2026. The two-year cumulative food inflation is therefore 5.0 to 6.5 per cent — against a background of already elevated prices.

Year Three (2028) and Beyond: The Structural Deficit

The third year is where the compound effect becomes structural. The professional diesel rebate scheme in Finland is not scheduled to take effect until 2028, but by then the cost structure of the agricultural sector will have been permanently altered. The farms that reduced fertilisation by 60 per cent in 2026 will have depleted soil nutrients. The farms that reduced cultivated area by 19.5 per cent will have idled land. The 77 per cent of farms that expected their liquidity to worsen will have faced three consecutive years of negative margins. The harvest losses are not recoverable in a single season. The soil degradation, the lost skills, the abandoned equipment, and the farm exits accumulate.

The refinery deficit, meanwhile, will compound. Damaged refineries are not rebuilt quickly. The IEA notes that “if the drone strikes cease, most can be brought back fairly quickly,” but the strikes have not ceased, and the ceasefire has not become a peace deal. Every month that a refinery remains offline is a month of lost output that cannot be recovered. The global refining system is not a bank account where missed production can be deposited later. It is a flow system. The flow that is missed is gone.

The food system’s response to three consecutive years of compound inflation is not a return to baseline. It is a permanent shift in the cost structure. The Finnish consumer who deferred the battery, the electric tractor, the precision-fermented protein, and the home garden will face, by 2028, a food bill that is structurally 10 to 15 per cent higher than in 2025, with the most vulnerable households — those already partly liquidated by the fiscal shock — bearing the highest relative burden. The holdout will still be holding out. The wound will still be unprocessed. The cycle will continue.

3. The Solutions

The solutions are not speculative. They are already in motion, and they follow the same logic as the battery and the solar panel: they are the material medicine, and they are being deferred.

Smart Agriculture

Finland has a national roadmap for smart agriculture to 2030, developed with stakeholders, addressing data economy, sensor-based AI, and machine learning for controlled cultivation environments. The DiAGRI infrastructure provides controlled growing facilities using sensor-based AI and machine learning solutions for the Uusimaa-Helsinki research community, running from 2026 to 2028. The SmartFarm Satakunta project runs from 2025 to 2027, supporting the long-term development of the region’s agricultural sector. The FARMAR project, coordinated by Durham University with Finnish participation, brings AI and robotics to agriculture from October 2026 to September 2030. The SAIMA project develops autonomous cultivation methods using shared sensor data and an agricultural cognitive AI framework. The technology exists. The deployment is the question.

Electrification of Agriculture and Transport

Finland’s electric tractor market is forecast to grow substantially for the period 2025–2031, with government incentives and subsidies already promoting adoption in the agricultural sector. Agritechnica 2025 showcased fully electric tractors approaching commercial use, with hybrids offering efficiency and flexibility in the interim. The Finnish government’s 2026 classification of emission-reduction measures identifies electric heavy excavators, large tractors, and forestry machines as key adoption pathways, with competitive support or tax incentives for electric or gas-powered trucks. The transition is structurally identical to the household battery transition: the technology is available, the economics are improving, and the adoption is lagging.

Vegetarian Diets

The new Finnish national nutrition recommendations endorse a more plant-based diet for human and environmental wellbeing. The Luke research on horticultural production value chains notes that domestic vegetable production has growth potential and that strengthening local production would promote the resilience of the food system and support security of supply. The dietary shift is not merely a consumer choice. It is a food-security measure. A plant-based diet requires less diesel per calorie than an animal-based one, because it bypasses the feed conversion layer. The diesel intensity of food is lowest at the base of the food chain.

Precision Fermentation and Cellular Agriculture

Finland has a national strategy for cellular agriculture. The VTT study on cellular agriculture value chains in Finland calculated the total microbial protein production potential from Finnish agri-food side streams and agri-biomasses at approximately 290,000 tons for precision fermentation and 360,000 tons for biomass fermentation — against a national protein need of 120,000 tons. Straw and oat husk alone could theoretically supply feedstock for 211,000 and 22,000 tons of protein per year respectively. The barriers are not biological. They are agricultural feedstock pre-processing and logistics, optimized facility location, and access to renewable energy. Solar Foods has reached full capacity at Factory 01 and plans to increase annual design capacity from 160 tons to 230 tons in 2026, lowering the production cost of Solein. The Finnish livestock farmers interviewed in the cellular agriculture study considered possibilities such as cell bank, biotech, energy, and input farming — the transition is not necessarily a displacement of farmers but a reconfiguration of their role.

Home Gardening

The Finnish Rural Network’s 2026 blog on home gardening as part of household preparedness states the case plainly: cultivation can support everyday security, food supply, and one’s own skills surprisingly well. It is not about complete self-sufficiency or a large farm. Even small-scale cultivation increases understanding of food production and offers the opportunity to grow part of one’s own food. In exceptional conditions, the availability of many products can weaken quickly. Then one’s own cultivation skills, seed saving, and the ability to use one’s own yard, vegetable patch, or balcony can bring security to daily life. Finland has a long history of home gardening and self-provisioning. The skills are not lost. They are dormant.

4. The Irony, Continued

The consumer who defers the battery is the same consumer who defers the electric tractor, the plant-based diet, the precision-fermented protein, and the home garden. The remedy is legible in every case. The rational track knows the medicine works. The emotional track needs recognition before conversion. The vent releases the pressure and the shock updates the map.

The irony is structural. A consumer who reads the FAO warning as a distant concern is reading a forecast that applies to their own food bill. A consumer who reads the Finnish food inflation figure of 1.6 per cent as evidence of resilience is reading a number that has not yet absorbed the full diesel shock, the harvest abandonment, or the El Niño overlay. A consumer who dismisses precision fermentation as science fiction is dismissing a technology that already produces 230 tons of protein per year in a Finnish factory. A consumer who ignores the home garden is ignoring the one food-security measure that requires no capital, no subsidy, and no supply chain.

The consumer is not arguing with the fact. They are arguing with a category, and the category is the grievance. What they reject is not the remedy. It is a stand-in they have built themselves. What they call evidence is just how it feels. And so nothing gets processed. The holdout stays. The cycle goes on.

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